Tangentopoli
The Tangentopoli
(Bribesville) case was probably the greatest corruption scandal happened in
Italy. It caused the collapse of an entire party system that had characterised
the First Republic[1]
since 1946. About five hundred members of Parliament, six former Prime Ministers
and thousand local administrators were investigated within the judicial inquiry
called Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) led
by Antonio Di Pietro. Everything began in February 1992 when a socialist
manager and director of a nursing home in Milan, Mario Chiesa, was arrested,
accused of a small bribe (7 million Lire, about 5000 GBP as of 2013) from a
businessman who had a cleaning contract at the home. At first Bettino Craxi, at
the time leader of the Socialist Party (PSI), affirmed that it was an isolated
case. However Chiesa, questioned by the Mani
Pulite pool of prosecutors, explained how the bribe was, by then, a sort of
“tax” and revealed a more complex network of bribery that involved almost all
political parties, especially the PSI and the Christian Democratic Party (DC).
The investigation went further on and, in a few
months, many top politicians, public managers and private entrepreneurs received
the official notification that magistrates provide to those who are under
investigation. Many of them were arrested and some even committed suicide. The scandal
had become nationwide.
In December Craxi himself was put under investigation and
on 12 February 1993 he had to resign from the leadership of the PSI. Citizens
began to protest asking the Prime Minister, Giuliano Amato, to force the
resignation of all politicians involved in the scandal. But the reaction of the
Parliament was the approval of the “decreto
Conso”, a law that aimed at decriminalising the illegal party financing. The
President of the Republic Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, however, decided to reject the
law[2]
defining it as unconstitutional. A few days later the Chamber of Deputies
denied the permission to conduct a legal action towards Craxi who had justified
himself saying that everyone sitting in Parliament took advantage from that
corrupt system of bribes. The left-wing parties demonstrated asking for new
elections while a group of protesters reached the Hotel Raphael, the Craxi
residence in the centre of Rome. As he came out of the hotel, protesters threw
coins to him and waved banknotes shouting: “do you want these too, Bettino?”[3] In
May 1993 Craxi escaped to Hammamet, in Tunisia, avoiding the arrest while
Silvio Berlusconi, an entrepreneur linked to Craxi, founded his party, Forza Italia, and won the 1994 general elections.
“The Mani Pulite
inquiries courageously exposed, but could not solve the issue of widespread
corruption in Italy”[4].
In this essay I describe the Italian systemic
corruption and its disclosure within the Tangentopoli
case through an analysis that embraces different fields: law, political
science, economics and anthropology. I try also to answer a few important
questions: a) what characteristics the Italian judiciary system had in order to
prosecute politicians and “white collars”; b) which processes led to the Tangentopoli crisis; c) which incentives
public agencies and politicians had to maintain such a corrupt system; d) how
the social and cultural context affected politicians behaviour and why
democracy was not able to tackle corruption.
Tangentopoli – A
Legal Perspective
An important characteristic of the Italian legal
system is the independence of the judiciary. While in France, for example, the
Minister of Justice hierarchically subordinates prosecutors for what concerns
promotions, disciplines and recruitment, in Italy there’s a magistrates’
governing council (Consiglio Superiore
della Magistratura, CSM) that takes these decisions. The Minister of
Justice in Italy has a much weaker role in orienting the investigations than
that of his colleagues in other European countries. Italian prosecutors have
the responsibility to make their own decisions regarding criminal initiatives
and priorities while, in France, the Minister of Justice implements such
policies. Moreover, unlike all the other democratic countries, in Italy
prosecutors have the same guarantees of independence as judges[5].
The Tangentopoli
case couldn’t have happened without this important feature that allowed
prosecutors of the Milan’s pool not only to be and look independent to the
public opinion but also to investigate and convict MPs, former Prime Ministers
and other powerful actors of the First Italian Republic without being
influenced by them.
In 1989 the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure was
reformed. The aim was to put adversarial normative principles in an
inquisitorial legal system. Later, however, Parliament and Constitutional Court
deeply limited the reform; the result is that the Italian justice system is a
mix of both. According to Dr. Riccardo Montana even the legal culture, which
can be described as ideas, values, expectations and attitudes towards laws and
legal institutions, represented in the Parliament of those years could
influence the justice system. Such legal culture affects and is affected by magistrates
too. With regards to this Montana affirmed that Italian prosecutors strongly believed
in the legality principle which in turn reflected the aspirations of the
constitutional fathers; referring to the Tangentopoli
case, he underlines how the notion of legality led to the impartiality that
characterised the Mani Pulite pool in
the 1990s[6] as
well as other magistrates like Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino who were
conducting important investigations against the Mafia in Sicily during the same
period.
An additional fundamental issue is the problem related
to the political party funding. In Italy, the 1974 law n.195 regulated State
funding for parties and the art.7 provided specific cases when it was
considered illegal. The law prohibited parties funding coming from public
administration agencies, public agencies, companies whose public assets exceeded
20% or companies whose public assets were less than 20% but where the public
subject had the control as well as companies that were not authorized by the
authorities in charge. The crime was punished with six to four years of jail
and a fee that was triple the amounts paid[7]. A
linked crime, especially during Tangentopoli,
is corruption. Regulated by the articles 318, 319, 320 and 321 of the Penal
Code, the crime is defined in all its different aspects. In the Italian legal
system corruption can be described as a particular agreement (pactum sceleris) between a public
official and a private subject[8]
presenting some differences with bribery crime, involving the abuse of power,
and with embezzlement[9], both
very common during the Mani Pulite
era.
The corrupt deal requires, at least, two subjects and every
legal system usually distinguishes active and passive bribery and it can be
found also in the art.2 and 3 of the Civil Law Convention of Corruption
provided by the Council of Europe[10]. Even
though both are criminal offences, sometimes, passive bribery is punished less
severely especially when the bribee receives the bribe before committing the
action promised to the briber; indeed this is the case of art.318 of the
Italian Penal Code that refers to the corruzione
impropria antecedente. It’s important to underline that neither side is
really passive because of the agreement they make before the commitment of the
crime[11].
The existence of many aspects of the crime brought the
Mani Pulite pool, a few years after
the scandal, to propose a reform that aimed at unifying all these different
types of corruption offenses under a single “Corruption” crime, so that
prosecutors’ investigations would have been simplified, especially in the first
phases of the process[12].
Tangentopoli- A
Political Science perspective
Tangentopoli definitely represented a huge crisis, although many
commentators explained the presence of a “perpetual crisis” within the Italian
system. The most interesting feature is not the crisis itself but the quality
to contain and assimilate it; La Palombara uses a metaphor to define this
capacity explaining how Italy is “a country that seems to lean out into the
void but never really falls into it, it may actually be firmly anchored there
like the Tower of Pisa”.
The nature of systemic corruption can be found in the
bipolar spheres of influence, characterising Italy for almost fifty years during
the Cold War as it definitely helped in establishing a continuity of such political
system that, in turn, caused widespread corruption. The presence of the
strongest Communist party of Western Europe, the Italian Communist Party (PCI),
guaranteed the long-lasting existence of the DC in power, without any concrete
chance to change the ruling class. This determined a completely static
situation (“immobilismo”). The DC,
according to the journalist and historian Giuseppe Tamburrano, wasn’t only a
political party but also an institution of the Italian state and so the PCI was
considered not only to be a democratic competitor but also a real systemic
alternative. In order to avoid any possibility of civil war, Italy has promoted,
over time, a sort of “consociational
democracy” mainly during the 80’s when the country had to face a strong attack
brought by political terrorism. While the DC held the power, the PCI was called
to contribute and share the responsibility for major reforms.
The conditions described above did not help in
contrasting corruption and, in some way, contributed to the establishment of a
political system called partitocrazia,
where the effective power is concentrated in political parties rather than in
citizens.
The view that corruption had its roots within the
political system was supported by Enrico Berlinguer, national secretary of the
PCI, that in 1981 launched the “questione
morale” (“the moral question”) campaign arguing that “nowadays political
parties are machines of power and clientele”[13].
However he didn’t receive sufficient support not even within his own party and
couldn’t see the Tangentopoli scandal
as he died in 1984 while delivering a public speech[14].
The disclosure of clientelist networks in 1992 brought
the electorate not to vote for parties implicated in the scandal and led to a change
of the electoral system itself in 1993, opting for a majority system. However
clientelism was not perceived as a completely new phenomenon because it has
been deeply inserted in the Italian political tradition since the end of World
War II. This tradition was possible because of a party domination of the state-apparatus
and was extremely convenient in order to generate electoral support, delegate
functions and furnish a tool of economic and social management. Clientelism
represents a socio-economic and political mechanism that not only excludes many
individuals and groups but it’s also very much related with corruption because
it operates through a reciprocal fulfilment of needs.
The popular disillusionment with the failure of the
traditional parties to put in practice serious reforms, between the 1980s and
the 1990s, fragmented the electoral base and prepared the ground for the Tangentopoli crisis. On their side
Conservatives were relieved by the fact that this “attack” on corruption came
from honest magistrates and not from communists. The prosecutors who composed
the Mani Pulite team were considered
local heroes because they were just doing their duty, while clearly many
politicians didn’t[15].
The Mani Pulite
investigations led to the discovery of clientelistic behaviours that were
illegal and tended to exclude the majority of the citizens, for these reasons
they were considered to be not tolerable. About 60,000 enti pubblici (public agencies) grew bit by bit in post-war Italy
and DC succeeded in transferring power to them in order to dominate specific
areas of the society; the administrative fragmentation was therefore increased.
So it’s not surprising to find that a huge number of public agency managers had
been investigated and convicted within the Tangentopoli
scandal. Indeed, public agencies like ANAS
(National Roadways Agency), AMSA
(Municipal Agency for Environmental Services), ATM (Milan Transport Agency), INAIL
(National Institute for Workers’ Compensation) were all involved in the inquiry
because they operated as intermediaries between private firms and political
parties.
According to several studies, corruption seems to
concern more educated classes[16]. The
Mani Pulite investigations brought to
light a system involving businessmen, bureaucrats and legislators; corruption
is linked to the level of education and, indeed, “white collars” generally committed
corruption crimes between the 1980s and the 1990s. This can be explained by
public and private actors skills in evading laws and regulations.
Tangentopoli-
An Economic Perspective
The economic
analysis of bribery and corruption is concerned about how economics can help
finding those aspects that cause corrupt incentives and how specific policies
and laws can be used against bribery.
Several studies
show that common law system countries, where the protection of property against
the state is higher, are less corrupted[17]. Other
factors like less hierarchical religions (Protestantism), higher levels of
education and income, less government regulations and expenditures and higher
degrees of population civicness can be found in less corrupt countries.
Studies
conducted by Del Monte and Papagni (2007)[18]
demonstrate that in Italy corruption crimes grew regularly between the 1970s and
the 1990s principally in the southern regions with a slight decrease after the Mani Pulite investigations in 1992-1993.
The economic theory of crime (Becker, 1968) tries to explain how a public
official weighs benefits and costs before committing a crime and what the
incentives are. The most important cost is the possibility of being caught and
punished followed by other subtle consequences like shame or loss of reputation[19]. In
Italy the cost-benefit calculus was altered considering that corruption was
systemic, especially during the 1980s, and characterised the whole political
system functioning[20].
Moreover it’s important to underline an initial inertia of the judicial system
towards such pandemic corruption also because it was difficult for some
magistrates to conduct investigations (it was very common to be subjected to
disciplinary actions by the CSM); this could be an explanation why corruption
was so widespread[21].
One of the
causes that contributed to Tangentopoli
was a law promulgated in 1977 that reorganised the contract rules for the
public Administration. Inserting more subjective elements in the choice, this
law allowed the Administration to limit the access to contracts only to the
agencies close to specific political parties. Avoiding disputes among agencies
was necessary in order to exclude other competitors and, at the same time, to maximise
profits. So meetings between the agency and the political representative became
a routine at all levels (regional, provincial, municipal); this system involved
the PCI too, even though its participation was different from all the others
because, in principle, they didn’t receive any bribe preferring to assure part
of the work to the agencies of the “Lega
delle Cooperative”[22]. This
latter subsidised the PCI through advertisement on the party newspapers, festival de l’Unità[23]
participations, absorption of functionaries in excess and other facilitations. Systemic
corruption in the 1980s was, indeed, based on a combined functioning that
required relations among different subjects of the corrupt procedure.
The economist
Mario Deaglio estimated that this system of bribery cost 10,000 billion Lire (about
7 billion GBP as of 2013) to the Italian citizens. Just to give a term of
comparison, consider that the annual debt interests amounted between 15,000 and
25,000 billion Lire[24] (between
11 and 18 billion GBP). However 1992 was a dramatic period for the Italian
economy because the ratio of public debt to GDP exceeded 105%[25], also
because of public expenses policies occurred in the 1980-90 decade, Moody’s downgraded
Italian rating[26]
and the Amato government was forced to enact a huge financial law which raised
taxes by 92,000 billion Lire (around 65 billion GBP)[27]. There
were no more resources to feed such a costly public administration, making even
more dramatic the scandal explosion.
Systemic
corruption leads to serious consequences like overinvestments in public
infrastructures to the detriment of education, as well as a reduction of the
legitimacy of governments[28] [29] [30] and
that’s exactly what has happened in Italy[31]. On its
side the government wasn’t able to take his own responsibilities because the
bureaucracy was too highly corrupt. Empirical evidence demonstrates that high
levels of public spending are associated with low levels of corruption, however
this association seems to be true only if citizens’ acceptance towards high
taxes is related to a general trust in the government and in its capacity to
spend public money in an efficient way[32]. Moreover
corruption distorts resource allocation and government performance; economic
agents tend to invest in corrupt activities rather than in productive ones
while public spending efficiency is reduced[33].
Tangentopoli-The
Anthropological Perspective
The conventional definition of corruption is too
narrow and concerned exclusively with the illegality of the actions. Anthropologists
remind us that corruption is a long run problem. Don Handelman (1981), for
example, underlines that in Western Europe the public office was conceived as
private property till the mid-19th century. Moreover he finds that
in the West “one is predisposed to feel and think in particular ways, perhaps
in terms of different logics, when one is within particular locales or settings
which are relevant to the frame”[34].
Western bureaucratic orders today have to be seen as a product of a series of historical
events.
Italo Pardo (2013) argues that while in Great Britain
laws against corruption are directed towards the private sector, in Italy they
are focused more on the public one. Generally such distinction brings to the
differences that characterise an advanced liberal democracy, like the British
one, from a weak State. Tangentopoli
showed an embroilment of politicians and economic agents in their attempt to
exploit, also through illegal practices, Italian system deficiencies and
weaknesses, blurring the distinction between public and private spheres; such system
is called “state capture”[35].
Corruption can be considered as a social act, so the
legality or illegality of a transaction is inevitably linked with a specific social
context. In order to understand corruption as a social behaviour Olivier de
Sardan (1999) introduced the term “corruption complex”. This term includes
different aspects of the phenomenon like abuse of power, nepotism,
embezzlement, prevarication and influence peddling[36]. So
the anthropologists would explain the causes that brought to systemic
corruption, like the increasing complexity of contemporary societies, looking
for “cultural” answers. They would also be interested in the single actors of
the scandal trying to study those “norms” that affected their behaviours and
reactions.
The high level of corruption in Italy can be also
justified observing a lack of social capital, a concept that “describes the
pattern and intensity of networks among people and the shared values which
arise from those networks”[37].
Social capital seems to be strongly related with low levels of criminality,
better public health, efficient administrations as well as reduction of
political corruption and tax evasion. Indeed, recent studies also demonstrated
that in the northern regions, where there’s a higher social capital, there are
also more efficient capital and labour markets[38];
instead, in southern regions tends to prevail the so called “amoral familism”
(Banfield, 1967)[39],
i,e. a family centric society which sacrifices the public good for the sake of nepotism
and the immediate family.
The Mani Pulite
judicial inquiry and the end of the First Republic were the representation of the
omnipotence of politicians that resulted to be, however, the cause of their own
ruin. After 1989 political parties felt that the defeat of communism would have
brought years and years of serenity and power while, on the contrary, they destructively
fell in a few months.
There was a different anthropological behaviour of the
DC members compared with the PSI ones. The former culturally believed in the
supremacy of the laws and the Italian constitution. Not even Andreotti,
nonetheless the accusations of being close to the Mafia, ever attacked the
magistrates. Another example concerns the President of the Republic, Oscar
Luigi Scalfaro (DC), who wanted the Constitution to prevail refusing the “decreto Conso” that represented a kind
of amnesty that would definitely help his own party. Moreover DC members didn’t
resist their collapse like they already knew their time was over; the fall of
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War erased the main reasons of their
existence. On the other side Craxi and the PSI members behaved very differently
trying to justify themselves and to accuse the Mani Pulite prosecutors of being politicized[40] but didn’t
succeed in convincing people. At a later stage Silvio Berlusconi, accused of
several crimes over the years, would have used the same method of delegitimization
against magistrates but his control over the media system allowed him to
convince a part of the electorate that the judiciary was really politicized, even
creating a specific word to describe judges that were prosecuting him: “toghe rosse”[41]. The
post-Tangentopoli era was
characterised by Berlusconism[42] that
was partially inspired by Craxism[43]
especially in the “culture” regarding the supremacy of the politics, believing
that electoral consensus would put politicians above the law.
Conclusions
In this essay I considered Tangentopoli through different perspectives providing analytical
approaches and theories able to account for that historical experience. As the
topic is concerned mainly with systemic corruption and its disclosure, the
research tries to explain such issues in order to give a wider comprehension of
processes, causes and consequences of Tangentopoli,
and the Mani Pulite investigations, that
represented crucial events of the Italian recent history. It was a crisis that caused
the emergence of old and sometimes hidden characteristics of the Italian
society. Although it transformed deeply the country, producing the collapse of
important political parties, Italy is still one of the most corrupt countries
in Europe, for this reason Tangentopoli
was a lost occasion. Following the famous Italian novel “The Leopard” by
Giuseppe di Lampedusa, “If we want things to stay as they are, things will have
to change.” And things actually changed, but not in the right direction.
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[1] An informal term to describe the Italian Republic
between 1947 and 1992.
[2] According to the Italian Constitution “The President
of the Republic, before promulgating a law, may request the Houses, with a
reasoned message, to deliberate again. If the Houses pass the bill once again,
then the law must be promulgated.” (Art. 74). In that occasion the law was not
submitted again by the Parliament
[4] Vannucci A., (2009), “The Controversial Legacy of
‘Mani Pulite’: A Critical Analysis of Italian Corruption and Anti-Corruption
Policies”
[5] Di Federico G., “Independence and accountability of
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[6] Montana R., (2012), “Adversarialism in Italy: using
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[11] Rose-Ackerman S., (2010), “The Law and Economics of
Bribery and Extortion”, Law School and Department of Political Science, Yale
University, pag. 6, New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8215.
[12] Pagliaro A., (2009), “Il diritto penale fra norma e
società. Scritti 1956-2008, Volume 4”, Giuffrè Editore, Milano.
[13] Tatò A., (1984), “Conversazioni con Berlinguer”,
Editori Riuniti, Roma.
[15] Waters S., (1994), “Tangentopoli’ and the emergence
of a new political order in Italy” West European Politics, 17:1, 169-182
[16] Eicher T., Garcia-Penalosa C., van Ypersele T.,
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[18] Del Monte A., Papagni E., (2007), “The determinants
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Political Economy 23(2): 379-396.
[19] Becker GS., (1968), “Crime and punishment: an
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[20] Fiorino N. and Galli E., (2010), “An Analysis of the Determinants of Corruption.Evidence
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[22] An Italian cooperative federation.
[23] An annual social-democratic celebration.
[25]
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[28] Mauro P., (1998), “Corruption and the composition of
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[29] Esty D., Porter M., (2002), “National environmental
performance measurement and determinants” In Environ- mental Performance
Measurement: The Global Report 2001–2002, ed. D Esty, PK Cornelius, pp. 24–43.
New York: Oxford Univ. Press
[30] Tanzi V., Davoodi H., (2002), “Corruption, growth,
and public finance”, In Governance, Corruption and Economic Performance, ed. GT
Abed, S Gupta, pp. 197–222. Washington, DC: IMF
[32] Rose-Ackerman S., (2010), “The Law and Economics of
Bribery and Extortion”, Law School and Department of Political Science, Yale
University, pag.4, New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8215
[33] Banca d’Italia, (2010), Disposizioni per la
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[41] “red judges”
[42] Guidelines and values inspiring Silvio Berlusconi’s
political policies.
[43] Bettino Craxi’s policies and values; word often used
in a denigrating way.
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