A
critical analysis of anti-corruption agencies
Author: Alessandro D'Alessio
Anti-corruption
agencies (ACAs) are public funded bodies that have the specific duty to tackle
corruption through both repressive and preventive activities and, in general,
are built under acts of an executive or legislature decree[1].
The first
ACAs can be traced in the postcolonial period after World War II. European
countries decided to create such agencies in order to restore the reputation of
their colonial administrators and to establish new authorities free from
corrupt practices. Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), established
by the British colonial government in 1952, the Anti-Corruption Agency of
Malaysia (ACA) in 1967 and the Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption
(ICAC), established by Governor Murray MacLehose in 1974, are considered to be
the most effective ACAs becoming also role-models for many other agencies all around
the globe.
When the
Cold War ended the location of such bodies shifted from developing to developed
countries because corruption soon became a topic discussed without those
stereotyped vision that caused it to be restricted to the southern hemisphere
for too many years. The Australian New South Wales Independent Commission
Against Corruption (NWS ICAC), born in 1988, as well as the French Service
Central de Prévention de la Corruption (SCPC), born in the early nineties, were
both a response to a wave of scandals that involved those countries. Moreover
the European Union accession process required countries to implement policies
against corruption creating specific agencies like the Lithuanian Special Investigation
Service (STT) in 1977 and the Croatian Office for the Prevention of Corruption
and Organised Crime (USKOK) in 2001. Since corruption was perceived as a global
problem, the anti-corruption efforts became global too.
Political
consensus often brought to the creation of ACAs especially after crisis or
scandals. Governments consider these agencies as the ultimate reaction to
corruption also because of the perceived failure of the conventional law
enforcement bodies like police, attorney-general offices, courts, etc. However
most ACAs, set up in a context of systemic corruption, have miserably failed
sometimes because of the lack of management/planning or problems related to
their institutional design.
According to
the most influential policy analysis of economic literature, corruption is a
“principal-agent” problem[2].
In order to act in their interests, principals have to choose, motivate and
monitor their agents. Anti-corruption reforms involve a re-alignment of
incentives, an establishment of new and appropriate equilibrium of punishment
and reward to foster agents’ behaviour as well as an enhancement of information
systems. Other social sciences disciplines consider corruption as something
that’s “within parallel structures of organisation and allegiance that have
only a tangential relationship to formal state structures. […] Networks and
alliances rely on exchanges to meet their objectives – and they may use
elements of the state and the political system to mediate these exchanges. Many
such exchanges are corrupt, in that they violate norms proscribing the use of
public power for private gain”[3].
So institutions themselves can be corrupt, facilitating irregular exchanges and
creating a vicious cycle where causes and consequences are strongly intertwined
and solutions for corruption are difficult to find. If politicians are corrupt they
would probably weaken the effectiveness of the judicial system which in turn
causes more corruption. Therefore anti-corruption efforts should involve as
much people and institutions as possible, also beyond traditional fences.
If
governments want to tackle corruption they should publicly recognise the problem
trying also to build bridges with the opposition in order to introduce a
comprehensive anti-corruption plan; members of the opposition could become
members of watchdog bodies supervising the institutional reform process.
Governments should cooperate with NGOs too in order to bring the most
influential of them on their side adopting a “non-confrontational” stance. In
this way the phenomenon of corruption is depoliticised, gaining greater chances
of success. The executive power has to establish a good relationship with the
media, for example involving the police and the prosecutors to investigate
public persons, including members of the governing party. The government has to
deal with the business sector too and, in order to ensure support, the best
strategy is to downsize the state or to low taxes as well as to avoid
instability and political crisis that can be very harmful for the economic actors[4].
On their side, it’s fundamental for ACAs to remain as much as possible outside
of the political dispute, so as to maintain a bipartisan support.
Each
anti-corruption agency is unique in the sense that its creation is the product
of specific legal and institutional patterns. Some countries provide them with
prosecution and investigative powers while others choose a more educational,
informative and preventive role. There has been also an increasing transfer of
knowledge among countries. However governments have too often just copied the
“successful models” showing no interest in the specific cultural and institutional
context in which they would operate. In fact, ACAs encounter a set of
difficulties in their action because of problems related also to the revelation
of corrupt activities via complaints as well as obtaining information about
corruption from other state agencies[5].
These aspects may considerably affect the effectiveness of their activities.
There are a
series of requisites that classify an agency as an ACA. The first one is
“distinctiveness” which means the agency has to be clearly different from other
enforcement bodies in terms of competences as ACAs’ main objective is primarily
to combat corruption. Both the development of “preventive and/or repressive”
dimensions of control and the “durability” feature are other important
requisites. An ACA needs also to have “powers to centralise information” (collection,
storage, processing, diffusion; information hub) and an interface that allows
the “articulation” of initiatives undertaken by other control actors. Other
fundamental requisites are “knowledge production and transfer” (role of
research, membership of and participation in international forums and networks)
and the “rule of law” (accountability to sovereign authority, checks and
balances). However practically just a few ACAs succeed in fulfilling all these
requirements because a standard model still doesn’t exist.
ACAs are
also increasingly intertwined with the international levels since world
institutions have always recommended the creation of such agencies as a
fundamental part of the grand strategy against corruption.
The Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) strongly implemented “ethics
infrastructures” within member states suggesting the creation of specialised
and independent agencies while, in 1997, the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe, through the Resolution (97) 24 on the Twenty Guiding
Principles for the Fight Against Corruption, drew the attention to the need “to
ensure that those in charge of the prevention, investigation, prosecution and
adjudication of corruption offences enjoy the independence and autonomy
appropriate to their functions” as well as the need of specialised and trained
people[6].
On their
side the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (IACAC), the African
Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and the United Nations
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) suggested the creation of these agencies
too.
In 2007 the
OECD produced a document entitled “Specialised Anti-Corruption Institutions:
Review of Models” attempting to identify three different types of agencies:
1) The “Multi-purpose Agencies with Law
Enforcement Powers” that can be described as anti-corruption agencies stricto senso with repressive and preventive
powers like technical assistance in prevention, information, public outreach,
investigation and monitoring. In order to preserve checks and balances the
prosecution power is often separated and this is also due to the independency
and range of powers of this ACA model. Examples of this type are the Hong Kong
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), the Singapore Corrupt
Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) and the New South Wales Independent
Commission Against Corruption (NSW ICAC).
2) The “Law Enforcement Type
Institutions” is the most common model in Western Europe and is characterised
by a mix of prosecution, investigation and specialised anti-corruption
detection competences, including research, prevention and coordination
activities. Examples are the United
Kingdom Metropolitan Police/Anti-corruption Command, the Spanish Fiscalía
Anticorrupción and the Romanian National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA).
3) The “Preventive and Policy
Co-ordination Institutions” is a model that includes mainly preventive
competences. The ACA can also have responsibilities related to researches in
the anti-corruption field as well as assessing the risk of corruption,
coordinating and monitoring local and national anti-corruption strategies,
implementing codes of ethics and promoting cooperation with the civil society. Examples
are the France’s Service Central de Prévention de la Corruption (SCPC), the
Permanent Commission against Corruption in Malta and the United States Office
of Government Ethics[7].
Despite all
these differences there are some common recognisable features among all the anti-corruption
agencies. The “independence” which is mainly referred to ACAs’ operational
autonomy since they have to be free from political interferences in order to
tackle corruption properly; the “inter-institutional cooperation and networking”
because ACAs are part of a control system, sharing competences with other national
bodies, but also part of international networks. Such networks are important to
transfer knowledge across institutions; organisations like the Group of States
Against Corruption (GRECO) of the Council of Europe, the International
Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA) and OLAF’s Anti-Fraud
Communicators Network are considered to be professional networks offering also
training to ACAs officials and promoting best practices. “Recruitment and
specialisation” and “wide competences and special powers” on their side are
necessary because the main reason of ACAs’ existence is often the inadequacy of
legal and criminal provisions in force, so their mission is to go beyond and
fight also those behaviours that are reprehensible but not unlawful. “The role
of research” is another fundamental characteristic that can be extremely useful
to guarantee a knowledge-based approach in tackling corruption, carrying out
empirical researches about different aspects of the phenomenon, while “durability”
is relevant for an agency because it can assure its effectiveness as well as a
long-lasting existence[8].
ACAs must be
clear in defining their focus. Indeed it’s important for them to choose specific
activities such as prevention, monitoring or choosing cases through different
criteria. The Hong Kong agency has a prospective jurisdiction, concerned only
with past cases; all the cases are referred to the Operations Managers
Committee, within the ICAC itself, after an evaluation made by an Assessment
Panel. The Anti Corruption Office (ACO)[9]
of Argentina is based on pre-defined standards, choosing cases selectively;
while others like the United States agency deals only with the honesty of the
public service. On the other side the Singapore’s CPIB has the power to
investigate crimes without selection criteria; while, according to the 1987
Philippines Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman can “investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient”[10].
The
Argentine ACO introduced a new way to pursue cases based on three criteria:
economic, institutional and social[11].
The economic one is based on the analysis of
the amount involved in the case, i.e. the investigation starts only if such
amount affects the functioning of a government institution; the institutional criterion is based on a
qualitative analysis and the cases are investigated only when they can prevent
the accomplishment of institutional functions of government institutions; finally,
following the social criterion, a
case needs to be investigated when a corrupt act can prevent a great number of
people from receiving public services.
Jeremy Pope,
co-founder of Transparency International (TI), believed that the most important
elements that make an effective ACA are its preventive activities, the
monitoring of the government’s anti-corruption policies, the right to access documents
and witnesses, power to seize travel documents and freeze assets as well as the
ability to protect informants. He also suggested that ACAs’ tasks should
concern only small investigations and monitoring units, keeping their size at a
minimum level. Pope was concerned with the independence of ACAs and recommended
a few structural protections like placing the ACA in a position where it is not
directly subject to political or ministerial dictates, the provisions for
appointment and removal of senior ACA officials and a direct role for public
stakeholders who provide a discrete political base for the agency[12].
Petter Langseth, International Good Governance and Anti Corruption Consultant, proposed that agencies should have
some sort of legislative role too, submitting reform bills to the parliament.
He also underlines the importance of including the creation of an ACA in a
wider national anti-corruption strategy[13].
Alan Doig,
senior coordinator for programmes & activities at the International
Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA), considers an ACA to be an “island of
competence” in the public sector, suggesting that they have the possibility to
solve only few specific problems like officials’ ethical honesty and government’s
credibility. Doig believes that the ideal anti-corruption agency model should
primarily link evaluations and research to a long-term agenda of reforms and
capacity building[14].
Other observers, like Kaufmann, stress the importance of the reorganisation of
the public and economic sectors in order to achieve a better implementation of
the anti-corruption policies[15].
What are the
main activities of an ACA? Due to their heterogeneity, it is difficult to give
a unique answer; for this reasons, in this evaluation I have considered three
ACAs (the Hong Kong ICAC, the Philippines Ombudsman[16]
and the Argentinian Anti Corruption Office, ACO), for which seven tasks can be
identified:
· Managing information on corruption. An ACA centralises all information and
intelligence about corruption and, through vertical integration, solves
coordination issues, asserting leadership. The number of successful
prosecutions as well as the number and quality of institutional reforms
designed to combat corruption and the intensity of anti-corruption activities
across society are indicators of the so called “intermediate outcomes” of an
ACA. These outcomes are linked to how well certain core anti-corruption
activities are performed – the “output measure”.
· Receive and respond to complaints. A typical and demanding task for the ACAs is
their relationship with citizens and firms. The ICAC in 2012 registered 3932
complaints, 63% of them were related to the private sector, 30% concerned with
government departments and 7% with public bodies. In the last few years over
70% of the complainants who decided to report corrupt activities were willing
to reveal their identities[17].
In 2013 the Office of the Ombudsman in the Philippines received 6158
complaints, 87% of which were evaluated[18];
while the Anti Corruption Office (ACO) in Argentina recorded 615 complaints
even though to 86% of them didn’t follow a judicial proceeding[19].
· Intelligence and monitoring. Almost all agencies provide data regarding this area although such
information shows very little about the quality of the efforts. Argentina ACO
has the competence to evaluate and monitor the content of sworn declarations of
public officers and situations that could bring to illicit enrichment or
incompatibility within the full use of their powers. The Philippines Ombudsman Estela
Perlas-Bernabe launched a Complaint and Case Monitoring System and she has the
competence to monitor the submission of Statements of Assets, Net Worth of
government officials and Liabilities. The Hong Kong ICAC, instead, controls its
activities through the adoption of a partnership approach. Such method is
characterised by the mobilisation of many different sectors against corruption
and, in the case of the ICAC, the government agencies are the most important
strategic partners[20].
· Prosecutions and administrative orders. Holding a trial against a person who is
accused of a corruption crime is not an activity conducted by every ACA, indeed
most of them can only investigate while other institutions carry out the
prosecution. The Argentinian ACO performance data show that around 2000
investigations started between 1999 and 2002, 82% of which were solved while
18% were still going [21]
[22].
The Philippines Ombudsman exceeds all other countries in terms of number of prosecutions
(around 7000 in 2012) although there’s a serious comparability problem since
the agency is the only one having powers to prosecute on its own. The Hong Kong
ICAC statistics show that 111 cases were prosecuted in 2012, with a person-based
conviction rate of 78% and a case-based conviction rate of 84%[23].
However it’s difficult to comment further such rates without knowing the
quality of the proceedings.
· Preventive research, analysis, and technical assistance. An important task of ACAs concerns
the research and the analysis about the diffusion and the forms assumed by the
phenomenon, as well as the technical assistance to public and private bodies that
want to adopt anti-corruption measures. For example the Argentina ACO
elaborates programmes of corruption prevention and promotion of transparency of
public governance and it is also integrated with the “Centro de Investigación
y Prevención de la Criminalidad Económica” an NGO concerned with the
investigation and prevention of economic crimes[24].
The Office of the Ombudsman is assisted by the Corruption Prevention Units,
which are civil society organisations, in disclosing corrupt activities in the
bureaucracy, and by the Junior Graftwatch Units that helps the Ombudsman
through the introduction of honesty and efficiency in the society as well as
awakening young citizens’ consciousness[25].
On its side the Hong Kong ICAC has a statutory duty to check procedures and
practices of public bodies and government departments and the law requires the
Commission to provide corruption prevention assistance on request to any member
of the public.
·
Ethics policy guidance and compliance review. Anti-corruption
behaviours can be promoted by means of several further tools. For example the
ICAC, through the Ethics Development Centre, promotes business and professional
ethics on a long-term basis[26]; it
also provides a series of documents like “Ethics In Practice-A Practical Guide
for Professional Engineers” or “Our Statement Of Business Ethics-ICAC” that
provide guidance for different sectors of the society, explaining why ethics
standard are important and furnishing a guide for good professional practices[27]. Among
the powers hold by the Office of the Ombudsman there’s also the “the observance
of high standards of ethics and efficiency” and the need “to serve as a model in
promoting the highest standards of ethics in the entire government bureaucracy”[28] [29]. The
ACO, on its side, not only reports an almost perfect compliance rate (“99.9%
compliance rate by the civil servants required to file a financial disclosure
statement”, 1999-2002)[30] but
provides ethics guidelines through several publications like “Ética, transparencia
y lucha contra la corrupciòn en la administraciòn pùblica. Manual para el ejercicio
de la funciòn pùblica”[31],
which is concerned with ethics standards provided to tackle corruption in the
public administrations, and “Guìa para el docente” that is an educational tool
provided by the British Embassy, the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) and the ACO for teachers[32].
· Public information, education and outreach. The Community Relations Department is the body
in charge of the ICAC for the education of the public and a recent annual
opinion survey shows that 98% of respondents believed that the ICAC deserved
their help[33].
The education and promotion aspects of the Philippines Ombudsman are concerned
with regular updates for employees and officials through Strategic Planning
Seminars, Research Symposium, Teaching Exemplars, Ehem Aha Seminars,
Orientation Lectures and Briefing, Research/Thesis Assistance Program as well
as projects related to the public such as: a radio program called “Magsumbong
sa Ombudsman”; a television program called “Ombudsman: Kakampi mo Laban sa
Katiwalian”; publication of anti-corruption materials and a nationwide accessibility
of the services (website, hotlines and e-mails)[34].
The Argentinian ACO provides education about prevention and transparency
through a series of publications that can be also downloaded from their website[35].
Measuring
the performance of ACAs is important but very complicated. In fact, evaluating
the results of the above tasks can be tricky because data might be inconsistent
or just untrustworthy. For example, it’s not clear if an increase of complaints
is a good indicator, as people trusts institutions and reports corruption
crimes more than before, or bad, as a result of wider corruption activities. Moreover
data about various activities of ACAs tell us more about the quantity of
activities rather than the quality of the efforts implemented by the agencies
and the effectiveness of its activity in terms of outcomes (the reduction of
the corruption). That’s why it’s better to rely on more indicators, also
external ones like the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index
(CPI), and different performance data. Among the above mentioned ACAs, the Hong
Kong ICAC seems to report better data on outcomes.
According to
the senior programme coordinator of Transparency International Ran Liao, the
levels of corruption of Hong Kong in the 1970s can be compared to the ones of
Argentina today. While in the CPI 2013 Hong Kong scores 75[36]
out of 100[37],
so it’s perceived to be less corrupt than United States and France; Monica Yu, executive
director of the Hong Kong Ethics Development Centre (an ICAC division),
affirmed that the people of Hong Kong nowadays will never tolerate corruption
and that there’s a lot of cooperation in terms of reporting cases to the ICAC[38].
It’s
important to understand why some anti-corruption agencies have been successful
and why others have failed.
In general the
success of an ACA does depend on many different factors such as: a wide
anti-corruption strategy, performance measurement, strong political backing and
realistic expectations. Another fundamental element that can lead an ACA to
success is the cross-agency relationships. Since ACAs operate along with sister
agencies it’s appropriate to secure cooperation among them to maximise the
efforts. For example both the Australia NSW ICAC and the Uganda IGG cooperate
with other bodies to improve their effectiveness while the Argentina ACO had to
face serious problems related to its relationships with the President, the
Congress and the courts too.
Moreover
there are also a series of conditions like political stability, public order, the
absence of macroeconomic crisis, a link between anti-corruption success and
political gain along with some basic features of the rule of law[39]
that need to co-exist in order to tackle corruption efficiently and maximise
ACAs’ efforts. However, these conditions cannot be found in most poor countries
and overwhelming dimensions of corruption can make any anti-corruption effort
useless. In a deeply corrupt environment maybe short-term successes are still
achievable through an anti-corruption agency but structural problems cannot.
The
experiences of the Hong Kong ICAC and Singapore CPIB agencies, both considered
to be very successful[40]
[41],
were born from a crisis of legitimacy that caused serious threats to political
stability and investors confidence. The reaction to such a situation was the
creation of new institutions with enough powers to tackle corruption; indeed ICAC
and CPIB present many common elements but also some important differences. The
first one’s budget is approximately around $90 million[42]
and it’s used to follow up all allegations and complaints linked with
preventive measures and the development of reforms as well as to a program of
community outreach. On the other
side the CPIB is much smaller with a budget of only $4 million[43]
even though the investigative mandate of the agency is as broad as that of
ICAC.
The Hong
Kong ICAC succeeded in doing investigations that lead to prosecution and
conviction of powerful businessmen and senior officials, it caused the “ethics
climate” to change through education, outreach and example, along with
citizens’ help in overseeing and reporting corruption cases. Starting the fight
against corruption with effective enforcement on major targets is extremely
useful to show the government’s determination to the public. This latter, in
fact, would be reluctant in reporting corrupt activities, that’s why every
successful anti-corruption set of actions must include this implementation that
acts also as a deterrent[44].
The ICAC adopts a three pronged strategy based on: 1) deterrence, through the
Operations Department, 2) prevention, through the Corruption Prevention
Department, and 3) education where the Community Relations Department conducts
activities that lead the public to a deeper knowledge of the phenomenon of
corruption[45].
The Hong
Kong ICAC model has had a huge influence on other agencies around the world.
Among these there are the Australia NSW ICAC, created in 1988, and the Botswana
DCEC, born in 1994. The DCEC, although has adopted the ICAC design almost
completely, presents some differences with the Hong Kong original since its
jurisdiction to take white-collar crimes is expanded but it has far more modest
resources causing its effectiveness to be severely limited.
Many other
agencies have been inspired by the ICAC embodying also many innovations. For
example, the Uganda IGG implemented public sector codes of conduct while
Ecuador CCCC delineates citizen oversight through a board chosen by civic
bodies.
The Singapore
CPIB is also considered to be a great success because of the investigations of
many “big fish” including MPs, senior directors in companies and ministers as
well as the setting of a new moral tone of government that caused the creation
of a very clean administration. Other reasons that explain the success of this
ACA are: extremely disposable officers towards the public especially when
people needs to complain corruption or give information; the effectiveness of
the anti-corruption law; a mature society that reports corruption with no fear
of reprisal as well as a general anti-corruption feeling[46].
The Singapore CPIB represents also an example of how strategy is important. Indeed,
in 1960, the CPIB was reformed in a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy that
combined deterrence and removal of opportunities through heavier penalties and
preventive actions.
The
Philippines Ombudsman has shown instead some problems related to lack of
independence towards the President as well as a low conviction rate especially
during the last years when the Office has been headed by Merceditas N.
Gutierrez[47]
(2005-2011). However we can consider the overall results quite satisfactory
particularly during the Simeon V. Marcelo era (2002-2005) when the former
President Joseph Estrada was also convicted for plunder because of investigations
started by the legal team of the Ombudsman[48].
The Argentina ACO showed some successes during its early years but it has
recently drawn some criticism; that’s because of its low performance in
prosecution[49]
and, since it’s subordinate to the government, it lacks of independence[50].
The Organisation
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2004 affirmed that generally ACAs
had obtained poor results with just a few exceptions like the ICAC and the
CPIB. The reasons why ACAs have been more successful in East Asia are still not
totally clear apart from the fact that in those countries the agencies have a
strong political and public support as well as meticulous investigative
methods, research abilities, innovative programmes of public education and
prevention. Alan Doig shows that having an ACA presents some advantages, for
example the government can send signals to the public showing how much is
taking the problem of corruption seriously or the achievement of high levels of
expertise. Doig underlines that there are also some disadvantages like higher
administrative costs or the creation of potential rivalries among institutions.
He also suggests some complementary institutional reforms that can reinforce the
performance of anti-corruption incentives like the establishment of independent
investigators and prosecutors, a transparent system to get rid of privileges, mechanisms
that can protect whistle-blowers, civil penalties and blacklisting of corrupt
companies.
Anti-corruption
agencies were born because of governments will to tackle corruption. This
essential reason means that there is an official recognition of the problem and
that ACAs represent the official response of the State to corruption.
Unfortunately many governments do not seem to be able to put up an efficient
and effective agency for their country. Indeed, for governments is important to
take into account the specific context in which the ACA has to work. This means
they have to consider, among other factors, also culture and, sometimes, all
those peculiar behaviours that are very close to a corrupt activity (e.g. the
“Guanxi”[51]
in China). Changing cultures and especially rooted traditions is a long-term
and difficult task and it’s achievable through educational programmes. However,
in order to fulfil such improvements, governments need to be strongly
determined and have enough money to invest.
An ACA alone
is not enough. It has to be supported by a clear national and local
anti-corruption plan to put the country on a virtuous cycle and slowly
eradicating, or drastically reducing, the problem; so a wide anti-corruption
strategy is the necessary step forward and, if correctly embedded in its
country’s reality, good results can be obtained.
Since some
agencies are relatively recent, for example the Argentina ACO was founded only in
1999, it is sometimes too early to affirm whether they’ve been successful, also
because it can take a while before those optimal conditions that lead to a
decline of the levels of corruption occur; that’s why in such cases the
analysis should be repeated in the future and the present results taken cautiously.
Bibliography
Anti-Corruption
Consultant Kwok Manwai
http://www.kwok-manwai.com/articles/Comprehensive_Effective.html,
8/5/14
http://www.kwok-manwai.com/Speeches/UNAFEI-Lawasia_conference_speech.html,
5/5/14
http://www.kwok-manwai.com/articles/Comprehensive_Effective.html,
5/5/14
CNN.com “How
Hong Kong cleaned up corruption”
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/15/world/asia/china-hong-kong-corruption/,
19/5/14
Council of
Europe Committee of Ministers
de Sousa
L., Hindess B., Larmour P., (2012), “Governments, NGOs and Anti-Corruption: The
New Integrity Warriors”, Routledge, p. 8
de Sousa
L., (2009), “Anti-corruption agencies: between empowerment and irrelevance”,
Springer Science + Business Media B.V. pp. 5-11
Doig, A.,
(1995), “Good government and sustainable anti-corruption strategies: a role for
independent anti-corruption agencies?”, Public Administration and Development,
May, pp. 151–165
Hong Kong
Ethics Development Centre - Mission
http://www.hkedc.icac.hk/english/aboutus/mission.html,
19/5/14
Hong Kong
Government Portal
http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/icac.pdf,
5/5/14
Hong Kong
Independent Commission Against Corruption
http://www.icac.org.hk/new_icac/files/cms/eng/12418pdf.pdf,
7/5/14
Investopedia.com
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/guanxi.asp,
13/5/14
Kaufmann,
D. (1998), “Revisiting anti-corruption strategies: tilt towards
incentive-driven approaches, Corruption & Integrity Improvement Initiatives
in Developing Countries”, UNDP
Langseth P.,
(2001), “Anti-corruption agencies, experts meeting, National Integrity Steering
Committee (NISC)”, 22 January
Meagher P.,
(2005), “Anti-corruption Agencies: Rhetoric Versus Reality”, The Journal of
Policy Reform Vol. 8, No. 1, 69–103, March 2005
OECD,
(2007), “Specialised Anti-Corruption Institutions - Review Models”,
Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Office of
the Ombudsman
http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/index.php?home=1&navId=MQ==&subNavId=ODY=,
16/5/14
http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/index.php?home=1&navId=NQ==&subNavId=OTY=,
5/5/14
http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/index.php?home=1&searchId=Nw==&tbId=0&tbn=YWJvdXR1cw==,
“Powers, functions and duties” 7/5/14
http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/index.php?home=1&searchId=Mg==&tbId=0&tbn=YWJvdXR1cw==,
“Seal”, 7/5/14
Oficina
Anticorrupciòn Repùblica Argentina
http://www.anticorrupcion.gov.ar/Estad%C3%ADsticas%20DIOA%20a%20Junio%202002.pdf,
6/5/14
http://www.anticorrupcion.gov.ar/documentos/INFORME%20ANUAL%202010.pdf,
8/5/14
http://www.anticorrupcion.gov.ar/documentos/Libro%20SICEP%202da%20parte.pdf,
7/5/14
http://www.anticorrupcion.gov.ar/documentos/Guia%20cuadernillo%20docente.pdf,
7/5/14
http://www.anticorrupcion.gov.ar/politicas_08.asp,
6/5/14
Philippine
Center for Investigative Journalism
http://pcij.org/stories/4-ombudsmen-4-failed-crusades-vs-corruption/,
9/5/14
Pope, J.
(1999), “The need for, and role of, an independent anti-corruption agency
prepared for Transparency International (TI)”, 13 August
Research in
Public Policy Analysis and Management,(2008),“Comparative Governance Reform in
Asia: Democracy, Corruption, and Government Trust”, Emerald Group Publishing
Limited
Rose-Ackerman,
S., (1978), “Corruption: A Study in Political Economy”, New York: Academic
Press.
Singapore Armchair
Critic Wordpress
http://singaporearmchaircritic.wordpress.com/2012/07/04/hong-kong-vs-singapore-ii-combating-corruption/,
15/5/14
Singapore
Budget 2014
http://www.singaporebudget.gov.sg/data/budget_2014/download/47%20PMO%202014.pdf,
5/5/14
Thailand
Development Research Institute
http://tdri.or.th/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/ali.pdf,
5/5/14
The United
Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders
http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_GG5_Seminar/GG5_Philippines2.pdf,
8/5/14
http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No69/No69_23VE_Man-wai2.pdf,
5/5/14
Transparency
International Corruption Perception Index 2013
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/,
19/5/14
United
Nations Office On Drugs and Crime
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session4/NGO/V1186440e.pdf,
9/5/14
What’s Up
In the Philippines Blogspot
http://bayan-natin.blogspot.it/2009/04/philippine-ombudsman-success-story.html,
9/5/14
[1] de Sousa L., Hindess B., Larmour P., (2012),
“Governments, NGOs and Anti-Corruption: The New Integrity Warriors”, Routledge,
p. 8
[2] Rose-Ackerman, S., (1978), “Corruption: A Study in
Political Economy”, New York: Academic Press.
[3] Meagher P., (2005), “Anti-corruption Agencies:
Rhetoric Versus Reality”, The Journal of Policy Reform Vol. 8, No. 1, 69–103,
March 2005, p. 77
[4] de Sousa L., Hindess B., Larmour P., (2012),
“Governments, NGOs and Anti-Corruption: The New Integrity Warriors”, Routledge,
pp. 92-94
[5] de Sousa L., (2009), “Anti-corruption agencies:
between empowerment and irrelevance”, Springer Science + Business Media B.V.
pp. 5-11
[6]
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/documents/Resolution(97)24_EN.pdf
[7] OECD, (2007), “Specialised Anti-Corruption
Institutions - Review Models”, Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and
Central Asia.
[8] De Sousa L., (2009), “Anti-corruption agencies:
between empowerment and irrelevance”, Springer Science + Business Media B.V.
pp. 13-18
[9] The Argentine Anti-Corruption Office (ACO) was
founded in 1999, replacing an ineffective predecessor agency.
[11] Meagher P., (2005), “Anti-corruption Agencies:
Rhetoric Versus Reality”, The Journal of Policy Reform Vol. 8, No. 1, 69–103,
March 2005, pp. 69-73
[12] Pope, J. (1999), “The need for, and role of, an
independent anti-corruption agency prepared for Transparency International (TI)”,
13 August.
[13] Langseth, P, (2001), “Anti-corruption agencies,
experts meeting, National Integrity Steering Committee (NISC)”, 22 January.
[14] Doig, A., (1995), “Good government and sustainable
anti-corruption strategies: a role for independent anti-corruption agencies?”,
Public Administration and Development, May, pp. 151–165.
[15] Kaufmann, D. (1998), “Revisiting anti-corruption
strategies: tilt towards incentive-driven approaches, Corruption &
Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries”, UNDP.
[16] Created in 1987, it has the task to control all three
branches of the government. The Offices of the Ombudsman includes the
Ombudsman's own office as well as offices for a team composed of a Sheriff, the
Ombudsman's second in command, and 6 other deputies who lead their respective
divisions.
[21] The ACO website doesn’t provide more recent
performance data.
[28] http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/index.php?home=1&searchId=Nw==&tbId=0&tbn=YWJvdXR1cw==,
“Powers, functions and duties” 7/5/14
[30] Meagher P., (2005), “Anti-corruption Agencies:
Rhetoric Versus Reality”, The Journal of Policy Reform Vol. 8, No. 1, 69–103,
March 2005, pp. 82-85
[34] http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_GG5_Seminar/GG5_Philippines2.pdf,
pag.115-116; 6/5/14
[37] The Index scores 177 countries and territories on a
scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).
[39] Kaufmann, D., (1998), “Revisiting anti-corruption
strategies: tilt towards incentive-driven approaches, Corruption &
Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries”, UNDP.
[41] Research in Public Policy Analysis and
Management,(2008),“Comparative Governance Reform in Asia: Democracy,
Corruption, and Government Trust”, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
[49] The ACO can only investigate but if there is evidence
of a crime it can request the prosecution through the Department for
Investigations.
[51] “A Chinese term meaning networks or connections,
understood to be a network of relationships designed to provide support and
cooperation among the parties involved in doing business[…]”. Guanxi can be
best understood by the old axiom, "it's not what you know, but who you
know that's important”. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/guanxi.asp,
13/5/14
Nessun commento:
Posta un commento